1 BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD 2 STATE OF WASHINGTON 3 IN THE MATTER OF A SHORELINE VARIANCE PERMIT ISSUED BY THURSTON COUNTY TO JAMES GRIGGS AND DENIED BY THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY, JAMES A. GRIGGS and THURSTON COUNTY, SHB No. 83-31 Appellants, FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 9 AND ORDER 10 STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY. 11 Respondent. 12

This matter, the appeal of a decision by the State of Washington, Department of Ecology, disapproving a variance permit granted by Thurston County to James A. Griggs, came on for hearing before the Shorelines Hearings Board, Rodney M. Kerslake, Beryl Robison, Nancy Burnett and Lawrence J. Faulk, members, convened at Lacey, Washington on November 11, 1983. Administrative Law Judge William A. Harrison

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presided. Member David Akana listened to the tape recordings and reviewed the record.

Appellant James A. Griggs appeared by his attorney, Robert E.

Lundgaard. Appellant Thurston County did not appear. References to

"appellant" hereafter refer to appellant James A. Griggs only.

Respondent appeared by Jay J. Manning, Assistant Attorney General.

Reporter Nancy J. Swenson recorded the proceedings. The proceedings were also electronically recorded.

Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were examined. From testimony heard and exhibits examined, the Board makes these

FINDINGS OF FACT

Ι

In 1980, appellant, James A. Griggs, bought a 1.3 acre site at the head of Fry Cove in Thurston County. He contemplated building his retirement home on the property.

II

In addition to the home itself appellant planned other improvements. A creek flows in a ravine on the sloping site. From this appellant would draw his water first by diverting it downhill to a storage tank, then pumping uphill to the homesite located some 12 feet or so above the cove. Appellant also plans pools within the ravine as part of an extensive garden to be located there.

III

To accomplish the construction of the water storage tanks and garden pools, appellant believes that vehicles must be able to drive to the foot of the ravine where it opens onto the cove. The ravine,

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however, makes up only 1/3 of the site. When purchased, the other 2/3 of the site contained a road ending at the overbut the steep hillside of the land intervening between the road and ravine extended fully to the soft tide lands, thus depriving appellant of the vehicle access he desired.

IV

Consequently, appellant acquired, free, from Thurston County, two surplus concrete piling, each 50 feet long and 18 liches in diameter. With a borrowed logging truck and his own tractor he succeeded in locating these, horizontally, on the tidelands some 14 feet waterward of the toe of the hillside. Using dirt excavated from the homesite in the hillside above, he then filled the area behind the concretepiling bulkhead. The road was brought to one end of the fill and further filling was planned onward into the ravine. The evidence does not show that appellant made any communication to county government before or during this project.

V

The waters of the Frye Cove cause minimal erosion to appellant's hillside. Such bulkheading as would be necessary to provide erosion protection to appellant's residence, if any, could be constructed at the toe of the hillside rather than 14 feet out onto the tidelands. The 14 foot space is wider, even, than necessary to allow vehicle access. There is no proposal to withdraw this project from the tidelands when development in the ravine is complete. The scale and shape of the project establish that it is a private beach front

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I |terrace in addition to whatever short term function it may serve as a construction road to the avine. Appellant has constructed stairs down the steep billside rom the homesite to the project. He has not 3 proven that such stairs wilt down into the ravine, and other materials transport sysems, could not be used to build the desired 5 improvements in the givine from the homesite above, rather than from a 6 tideland construction road. VΙ 8 9 Before more 'ill was placed, a county official encountered the project and ordered that no further work take place. The official 10 also asked appellant to apply for a variance from the provisions of 11 12 the Thurston Region Shoreline Master Program (TRSMP). Appellant did apply for a variance on December 6, 1982... 13 14 VII At the time appellant purchased his property, and at all times 15 relevant to this matter, the appellant's shoreline was designated 16 17 "conservancy" by the TRSMP. Section VIII, D-2. 18 VIII 13 Within the conservancy environment, "Landfilling shall not be 20bermitted for the purpose of creating new land area." TRSMP, Section 21IV, p. 47, Landfilling and Dredging, paragraph 1. 22 IX 23 Within the conservancy environment: 24Bulkheads may be constructed only to provide necessary protection to a residence or valuable 25historical site. 'Necessary' shall mean that

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imminent.

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physical damage to the structure or historic site is

Τ TRSMP, Section IV, p. 52. Shoreline Works and Structures, paragraph 1. $\mathbf{2}$ χ 3 Within the conservancy environment, "Bulkheads shall be 4 constructed as close to the bank as feasible." TRSMP, Section IV, p. 5 52, Shoreline Works and Structures, paragraph 3. 6XΙ 7 The Thurston County Planning Department recommended that 8 appellant's variance request be denied. Following public hearing, the 9 Thurston County Hearings Examiner granted the variance on April 28, 10 The variance was then submitted to the Washington State 11 Department of Ecology (DOE) which disapproved it on June 24, 1983. 12 From this disapproval, appellant appealed to this Board on July 22, 1983. XII 15 Any Conclusion of Law which should be deemed a Finding of Fact is 16 hereby adopted as such. 17 From these Findings the Board comes to these 18 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 19 Ι 20° Appellant, the person requesting review herein, has the burden of 21 proof. RCW 90.38.140(7). 22 ΙI 23 Appellant's bulkhead and fill project is a "substantial 24development" as that term is used in the Shoreline Management Act at 25

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RCW 90.58.030(3)(e) which states: 2 'Substantial development' shall mean any development of which the total cost or fair market value exceeds 3 one thousand dollars, . . (emphasis added). Although built, in part, with surplus materials, appellant has not 5 proven that the fair market value of his project does not exceed one 6 thousand dollars. The function of the fill as a vehicle access disqualifies the project from the exemption for, "Construction of the 8 normal protective bulkhead common to single family residences" found 9 in the definition of substantial development at RCW 10 90.58.030(3)(e)(ii). 11 III 12 Were appellant's bulkhead and fill project not a substantial 13 development, it would nevertheless be a "development" as that term is 14 defined at RCW 90.58.030(3)(d): 15 'Development' means a use consisting of the construction or exterior alteration of structures; 16 dredging; drilling; dumping; filling; removal of any sand, gravel or minerals; bulkheading; driving of 17 piling; placing of obstructions; or any project of a permanent or temporary nature which interferes with 18 the normal public use of the surface of the waters overlying lands subject to this chapter at any state 19 of water level. (Emphasis added.) 20 ΙV 21Both a "substantial development" and a "development" must be 22 consistent with the policy of the Shoreline Hanagement Act and the 23 applicable master program, here the TRSMP. RCW 90.58.140(1) and (2). 24 v 25 Appellant's bulkhead and fill project on the tidelands is 26

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inconsistent with: 1) the TRSMP prohibition against creating new land area by landfill, Section IV, p. 47; 2) the TRSMP rule permitting bulkheads only for necessary protection of a residence, Section IV, p. 52; and 3) the TRSMP rule that bulkheads shall be constructed as close to the bank as feasible, Section IV, p. 52. (See Findings of Facts VIII, IX, and X, above, for the text of these TRSMP provisions.)

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Under the Shoreline Management Act, at RCW 90.58.100(5) there is a provision for variance permits. Variance permits are to be allowed by provisions both in the master program (TRSMP) and in the rules adopted by the Department of Ecology (DOC) relating to establishment of a permit system. Id. As between the master program (TRSMP) variance rule and the DOE variance rule, the more restrictive applies.

WAC 173-14-155. Any shoreline variance permit granted by a local government must be submitted to DOE for its approval or disapproval.

RCW 90.58.140(12).

VII

In this case, appellant has placed landfill for the purpose of creating new land area. That is a shoreline use which is prohibited by TRSMP, Section IV, p. 47 in the conservancy environment. Both the TRSMP variance rule and the DOE variance rule disallow any variance which would authorize a prohibited use. Appellant's variance

. The TRSMP variance rule, Section VII, pp. 85-86, provides

<u>Variances</u>: [The Thurston County Hearings Examiner] may grant variances from the regulations of this

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frequest was therefore properly denied by DOE. 2 VIII 3 Even were appellant's bulkhead and fill project not a prohibited 4 use, his application would not meet the applicable DOE variance 5 criteria, WAC 173-14-150(3) and (4). Though a water storage tank 6 7 (Cont.) 8 Program, for reasons of promoting the public health, safety, and general welfare, subject to Department of Ecology 9 approval; PROVIDED, that no variance will be granted which would permit a use otherwise prohibited outright in a 10 particular environment... (Emphasis added.) 11 The DOE variance rule, at WAC 173-14-150(5) provides: 12Requests for varying the use to which a shoreline area is to be put are not requests for variances, but 13 rather requests for conditional uses. Such requests shall be evaluated using the criteria set forth in 1.4 WAC 173-14-140. 15 At WAC 173-14-140(3) relating to conditional uses, it states, *Uses which are specifically prohibited by the master program may not 16 be authorized." (Emphasis added.) 17 2. The applicable DOE variance criteria, at WAC 173-14-150, are: 18 (3) Variance permits for development that will be located either waterward of the ordinary high water 19 mark (OHWM), as defined in RCW 90.58.030(2)(b), or within marshes, bogs, or swamps as designated by the 20 department pursuant to chapter 173-22 WAC, may be authorized provided the applicant can demonstrate all 21of the following: (a) That the strict application of the bulk, 29 dimensional or performance standards set forth in the applicable master program precludes a reasonable use of 23the property not otherwise prohibited by the master program. 24 (b) That the hardship described in WAC 173-14-150(3)(a) above is specifically related to the 25 property, and is the result of unique conditions such as irregular lot shape, size, or natural features and 26

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and garden pools in the ravine or even a waterfront terrace may be reasonable uses of appellant's property, appellant has not shown that these are precluded by the TRSMP prohibition against filling for new hand in a conservancy shoreline environment. (See Finding of Fact V. 5 above, regarding improvement of the ravine and Finding of Fact II, 6 above, regarding the existence of a road ending at the cove, showing 7 the possibility of a waterfront terrace at or beside its end, landward 8 of the ordinary high water mark.) Thus, appellant would not meet WAC 173-14-150(3)(a) and (b). Although the project would not 10 adversely affect public rights of navigation, -150(3)(e), it would not 1] be compatible with other permitted uses, -150(3)(c); it would 12 constitute a grant of special privilege, -150(3)(d), if it alone were allowed; or, would create disruptive cumulative effect inconsistent 14

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the application of the master program, and not, for example, from deed restrictions or the applicant's own actions.

- (c) That the design of the project will be compatible with other permitted activities in the area and will not cause adverse effects to adjacent properties or the shoreline environment designation.
- (d) That the requested variance will not constitute a grant of special privilege not enjoyed by the other properties in the area, and will be the minimum necessary to afford relief.
- (e) That the public rights of navigation and use of the shorelines will not be adversely affected by the granting of the variance.
- (f) That the public interest will suffer no substantial detrimental effect.
- (4) In the granting of all variance permits, consideration shall be given to the cumulative impact of additional requests for like actions in the area. For example if variances were granted to other

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1 with the policies of RCW 90.58.020 as implemented by the 2 conservancy rules of the TRSMP if others were allowed, -150(4); 3 and therefore would have a substantial detrimental effect on the 4 public interest, -150(3)(f). 5 IX 6 Any Finding of Fact which should be deemed a Conclusion 7 of Law is hereby adopted as such. 8 From these Conclusions the Board enters this 9 10 11 12 13 1.4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2. (Cont.) 22 developments in the area where similiar circumstances exist the total of the variances should also remain 23consistent with the policies of RCW 90.58.020 and should not produce substantial adverse effects to the 24 shoreline environment. 25 26FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER

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ORDER

The Department of Ecology's disapproval of appellant's variance permit is affirmed.

DATED this 30th day of December, 1983.

SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD

David alean
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21 Administrative Law Judge

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